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ABSTRACT
Vietnam has only recently emerged as a participant in the 
rapidly growing Asia Pacific economy, having rejected 
central planning in favour of a market driven economy by 
the late 1980s, and is now poised to become Asia’s next 
economic “dragon”. Its economic performance during the 
1990s has been truly remarkable, with the growth of real 
GDP, consumer price inflation and export growth showing 
considerable, and sustained, improvement over tha t of the 
1980s. This contrasts starkly with the experiences of other 
economies in transition, central and eastern Europe in 
particular, whose transition process has been considerably 
more difficult, with severe downturns in GDP growth and, 
in most cases, ruinously high rates of inflation. However 
China, another transition economy, has performed in 
general better than  Vietnam in terms of both of these 
macroeconomic variables.
What makes this performance even more remarkable is 
tha t it has been achieved against a background of loss of 
foreign assistance from the former Soviet Union, a loss of 
cheap imports and the need to re-orientate its foreign trade 
due to the demise of the CMEA (Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance), no substantive multilateral or 
bilateral assistance from the west until late 1993, and the 
US trade embargo, in existence since the end of the 
Vietnam war, which only ended in February 1994.
A crucial factor behind this recent economic resurgence 
of the economy has been the decision by the government to 
implement major economic reforms, in 1986 and later re­
affirmed in 1989, which would transform the economy from 
being centrally planned to a  market economic system. A key 
objective of this paper is, therefore, to identify the major 
economic reforms which have already been instigated and 
the macroeconomic performance of the economy since
1986, as well as its future economic prospects and 
challenges emphasising, in particular, the crucial 
contribution of foreign direct investment and overseas 
development assistance (ODA) in this process.
This paper was presented at the twenty-third annual meeting of the Midsouth 
Academy of Economics and Finance, February 7-10, 1996, Atlanta, Georgia, 
USA.
INTRODUCTION
Vietnam has only recently emerged as a participant in the most 
rapidly growing region of the world economy, the Asia Pacific 
economy. It is poised to become one of Asia's most vigorous 
market economies during the remainder of the 1990s and into the 
twenty first century, having rejected central planning, and is 
widely tipped to become Asia's next economic "dragon". 
Considerable interest in its development and future prospects 
have already been demonstrated by a number of economists and 
economic institutions (see for example World Bank (1993), 
Economist Intelligence Unit (1995), Quinlan (1995) and De Vylder 
and Fforde (1995) to name but a few).
Its recent economic performance has been truly remarkable. 
Real GDP growth was 8.7% in 1994, and is projected to be 8.0% 
during 1995, and averaged 7.4% over the extended period 1989- 
94. Consumer price inflation dropped from 67.6% in 1991, the 
highest since 1989, to 14.4% in 1994 and is projected to decline 
further to 12.7% for 19951. Exports have also expanded rapidly 
in recent years, increasing at an average annual rate of over 30% 
since 1988, with rice production reaching a historical high in 1994 
enabling the country to maintain its position since 1989 as the 
world's third largest exporter of rice. This contrasts starkly with 
the experiences of other economies in transition, central and 
eastern Europe in particular, whose transition process has been 
considerably more difficult, with severe downturns in GDP 
growth and, in most cases, ruinously high rates of inflation. In 
contrast China, another transition economy, has performed in 
general better than Vietnam in terms of both of these
1 This projection was made by the IMF in May 1995.
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macroeconomic variables. However such a comparative analysis 
is beyond the scope of this paper.
What makes the performance of Vietnam even more 
remarkable is that it has been achieved against a background of 
loss of foreign assistance from the former Soviet Union, which at 
its peak amounted to $1 billion (US), a loss of cheap imports and 
the need to re-orientate its foreign trade towards Asia in 
particular with the demise of the CMEA (Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance), effectively no substantive multilateral or 
bilateral assistance from the west until late 1993, and the US 
trade embargo, in existence since the end of the Vietnam war, 
which only ended in February 1994.
In spite of these successes Vietnam remains one of the poorest 
countries in the world, with a per capita GNP of around $220 
(World Bank). Decades of war and economic mismanagement 
have left the economic infrastructure in very poor condition. In 
recent years over 1 million workers and soldiers have been 
released from the public sector, substantially increasing the ranks 
of the unemployed. However social indicators remain quite good 
for a country at the level of economic development which it has 
achieved.
A crucial factor behind this recent economic resurgence of the 
economy has been the decision by the government to implement 
major economic reforms, in 1986 and later re-affirmed in 1989, 
which would transform the economy from being centrally planned 
to a market economic system. A key objective of this paper is to 
identify the major economic reforms which have already been 
instigated and the macroeconomic performance of the economy 
since 1986, as well as its future economic prospects emphasising, 
in particular, the crucial contribution of foreign direct investment 
and overseas development assistance in this process.
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BACKGROUND
In April 1975 communist controlled North Vietnam took control 
of Saigon, leading to the fall of the government of South Vietnam. 
The nation was officially reunified in January 1976, and in July of 
the same year the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was established. 
The reunification of the North with the South brought together 
two very different economic systems. The North with a state 
socialist centralised economic system, and that of the South with 
its decentralised market economic system. Initially, during the 
Second Five Year Plan (1976-80), the communist government 
attempted to impose the northern model on the South (the so 
called "transition to socialism")—collectivisation of agriculture, 
nationalisation of industries, state monopoly over trade etc., 
however as early as 1977 it was becoming clear that such a 
strategy was not working. Declining agriculture production in 
1977 and 1978, indicative of a general deterioration of the 
economy, prompted the first steps towards reform which were 
initiated by the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee in 
September 1979. This resulted in a number of piecemeal reform 
measures thereafter and over the course of the Third Five Year 
Plan (1981-85). The reform measures included giving private 
enterprise, predominantly based in the South, greater autonomy 
from the state, collectivisation of agriculture, subject to resistance 
in the South, was suspended, the introduction of a contract 
system giving households more freedom to sell their excess 
production in the open market, and finally individual households 
were allowed to cultivate land not in use by the cooperatives.
Economic performance improved noticeably over the Third 
Five Year Plan, however the economy still encountered a number 
of problems by the mid 1980s. These included a levelling off of 
agricultural production, exacerbated by renewed attempts to 
collectivise agriculture in the South in 1984, due to peasant 
farmers destroying their crops and abandoning the sector
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altogether. Inflation, however, was the biggest problem due 
primarily to food shortages and a rapid increase in the money 
supply. The latter primarily accounted for by the monetisation of 
the state budget deficits. Over the period September 1985 to 
September 1986 inflation rose to a ruinously high level of over 
700%, prompting the government to accept the need for more 
fundamental reform measures.
ECONOMIC REFORM UNDER "DO IM O I" OR RENOVATION 
(1986-1989)
At the Sixth National Congress in December 1986 the government 
introduced a comprehensive reform program, with the objective of 
liberalising and deregulating the economy. The reform measures 
explicitly recognised the failure of central planning and marked a 
major turning point in the economic development of the economy. 
The objectives of the reform were:
1. to develop the private sector
2. to increase and stabilise agricultural output
3. to shift the focus of investment from heavy to light industry
4. to reduce the role of the state enterprises
5. to focus upon export led growth, based upon the experience of 
Vietnam's dynamic regional neighbours
6. to attract foreign direct investment, seen as essential for economic 
development.
After 1987 a number of the far reaching reforms were 
implemented, and this process was accelerated from 1989 
onwards and into the 1990s, and included the following:
a. Rural reforms—the collective agricultural system was largely 
dismantled, with the focus on family farming on the basis of 
long term leases.
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b. Price liberalisation—virtually all price controls were removed 
with the exception of fuel, electricity, transport and postal 
services.
c. Devaluation—the exchange rate was unified and sharply 
devalued. Foreign exchange trading floors were created 
which enabled the exchange rate to be largely determined by 
the market.
d. Interest rate reforms—interest rates were raised to very high 
levels, with the objective of making real rates positive, as 
part of the fight against inflation. After some initial success 
in reducing inflation in 1989, real rates of interest were 
allowed to become negative again and in 1990 and 1991 
inflation returned. Since 1992 real interest rates have 
primarily remained positive, contributing to the sizeable 
decline in inflation thereafter.
e. Fiscal reforms—the government implemented measures to 
reduce the growth of public expenditure, including the 
demobilisation of the military (500,000 soldiers in total 
have been released) and the elimination of direct subsidies 
to state owned enterprises. Tax reform, in addition to the 
fortuitous revenue from petroleum operations, enabled the 
government to increase its revenues.
f. State enterprise reforms—included the elimination of direct 
budgetary subsidies from the government, and a further 
hardening of the budget due to the higher real interest rates 
which had to be paid for credit as previously identified. 
State enterprise managers by 1989 were no longer subject to 
the need to achieve centrally determined production targets, 
the influence of which had declined significantly since 1986, 
but had greater autonomy in determining where their output 
was sold and where input could be obtained from on the 
basis of market prices.
g. Promotion o f the private sector—after many years of 
discrimination the government now actively promoted the
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development of the private sector, although its contribution 
to GDP is still small. Laws introduced for companies and 
private enterprises gave the once informal sector official 
sanction. This was identified further in the country's new 
Constitution (in 1992) which clarified the rights of the 
private sector.
h. Financial sector reform—this involved the restructuring of the 
banks, which dominate the financial system, into a two tier 
system with the State Bank of Vietnam performing the 
function of a modem central bank, and the four major state 
owned commercial banks providing banking facilities. The 
financial system is being further expanded to include 
shareholding banks, credit cooperatives and joint venture 
banks. Foreign banks have been allowed to operate since 
1991 and the government is developing a securities market 
which is planned to be operative in 1996/97.
i. Legal system reform—arising from the creation of a market 
system is the need to develop the institutional structures 
necessary for its functioning. Of particular importance is the 
reform, or creation, of a legal framework to provide the 
framework for the operation of the market system, given the 
reduced direct involvement of the government. For example 
the introduction of a foreign investment law (1987), 
bankruptcy law (1993), environmental law (1993), land law 
(1993), and most importantly the 1992 Constitution which 
proclaimed individual rights and guaranteed against the 
nationalisation of foreign investments.
j. Openness to direct foreign investment—the government 
recognised the importance of direct foreign investment in the 
process of economic development, and a new investment 
law, with subsequent revisions, indicated the government's 
desire to attract such investment.
k. Foreign trade reform—this had been the monopoly of the 
state, but now firms both state and private were to have 
easier access to imports and more incentives to export. The
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latter aspect was clearly seen as being important, being 
based upon the export led growth of its dynamic regional 
neighbours in East Asia.
1. Social reform—the reform program was seen as likely to 
contribute to a transitional rise in unemployment, and in 
response to this likelihood the government initiated 
programs including retraining schemes and soft loans for the 
small scale private sector.
In essence doi moi is characterised primarily by its focus upon four 
key areas in particular—agricultural reform, price liberalisation 
and state enterprise reform, trade liberalisation, and foreign direct 
investment liberalisation.
Agricultural reform was regarded as a key constituent due to 
problems with inconsistent and unpredictable yields. In April 
1988, under the guidelines of resolution number 10, farming 
cooperatives were no longer considered to be the centre of 
production. Instead, farm households became the essential 
production unit, with the cooperatives providing farm supplies, 
storage facilities and marketing arrangements. Membership of a 
cooperative became optional, and rights of full land use, 
inheritance, and transfer were recognised by the state. Long term 
leases were also extended, from 15-20 years for annual crops and 
50 years for trees. These measures led to an immediate jump in 
farm output such that after facing near famine conditions in some 
parts of the country in 1988, Vietnam emerged as the world's 
third largest rice exporter one year later. These measures were 
supplemented by further agricultural reforms.
A second key area for reform is that of trade. Under the 
centrally planned system, external trade was tightly controlled by 
the government and it was focused towards that with the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe. All foreign trade transactions had to 
be channelled through central state trading corporations. Prices
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were administered by the government and targets were fixed for 
both imports and exports. Adding to the difficulty of trading was 
the maintenance of a complex system of multiple exchange rates.
To improve the country's trade performance the dong was 
devalued in early 1988, narrowing the spread between the official 
and parallel market rates. In 1989 a new tariff schedule was 
introduced, while quotas on imports and exports were lowered. 
The monopoly held by the central state trading corporations was 
eliminated when provincial and local authorities were allowed to 
establish competing foreign trade companies.
Complementing the deregulation of trade was the liberalisation 
of foreign direct investment, another key component of doi moi. 
New regulations governing foreign investment became effective in 
January 1988, and are considered to be some of the most liberal in 
Asia. All sectors of the economy, in principal, are open to foreign 
investors, although special incentives were attached to 
investments that promoted exports and generated hard currency 
earnings. Since the new foreign investment regulations came into 
effect, Vietnam has approved nearly $9 billion in foreign 
investment projects. However the number of projects actually 
carried forward has been less.
With the collapse of the Eastern bloc in 1989 the focus of the 
economic reforms has been placed upon the foreign trade regime 
as Vietnam is forced to seek new markets (including suppliers) to 
replace its Eastern bloc partners, and attention has been directed 
towards the dynamic economies of East Asia. To encourage 
exports exporters are allowed to retain 100% of their foreign 
exchange earnings and, completing a series of adjustments that 
began in 1987, the official exchange rate was brought into line 
with the free market rate and was thereafter to be set by the 
market. Export subsidies and a number of import duties and 
export taxes were also abolished.
This section attempts to identify recent macroeconomic 
developments in Vietnam arising from the reform program 
previously outlined. In doing so emphasis is given to 
developments in GDP, savings and investment, consumer price 
inflation, the exchange rate, exports, imports and the current 
account over the period 1989-95 wherever possible.
The reforms have had a major impact upon the economy, and 
it is once again important to emphasise that these have been 
implemented without any substantive multilateral or bilateral 
assistance until late 1993. There was a significant initial 
improvement in the growth of real GDP in 1989 (see Table 1) 
arising from the further impetus of reform measures in this year 
and the further confirmation of the process of "doi moi", 
primarily due to a substantial increase in output in the agriculture 
and services sectors. These offset a sharp decline in industrial 
production arising from the loss of markets and cheap imports of 
inputs from the CMEA2, the elimination of budgetary subsidies to 
the state owned enterprises, and the additional hardening of the 
budget for them with the imposition of positive real interest rates 
and loss of financial assistance from the former Soviet Union. 
During 1990-91 these external developments contributed to a 
downturn in the economy, which was very mild in comparison to 
the recessions being experienced in Eastern Europe at the time, 
with the growth of industrial production now overtaking that of 
the agriculture and services sectors (see Table 1). The period 
1992-95 has since seen a rapid pick up in the growth of the 
economy, with the growth of industrial production leading the 
way. The growth of services production has also been strong, 
whilst that of agriculture has declined.
THE ECONOMY IN THE 1990S
2 The CMEA was formally abolished in January 1991.
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A major contributory factor behind the growth of output is 
domestic investment. In 1988 (see Table 2) total domestic 
investment accounted for 8.1% of Vietnam's GDP, of which half 
occurred through the state budget with foreign direct investment a 
paltry 0.5% of GDP. Thereafter total investment accrued steadily 
reaching 22.2% of GDP in 1994, of which only 6.6% took place 
through the state budget and the remainder coming increasingly 
from the domestic private sector and FDI. FDI accounted for 6.4% 
of GDP, a twelve fold increase over the figure in 1988.
To fund such investment, and hence growth, the need for 
domestic savings and access to foreign savings becomes 
imperative. In 1988 domestic savings were negative and domestic 
investment had to be funded from foreign savings, primarily 
financial assistance from the Soviet Union (see Table 2). 
Thereafter, as a result of the confidence engendered by the further 
reforms from 1989 in terms of recognition of private sector rights, 
reduced inflation, banking sector reforms and positive real 
interest rates, domestic savings displayed a remarkable 
transformation rising steadily from a figure of 5% of GDP in 1989 
to 16.6% in 1994. The contribution of foreign savings declined 
during the period 1989-92, but increased again in 1993 and 1994. 
Such sources of savings will be crucial for Vietnam to fund its 
desperately needed investment and growth.
Tables 1 and 2 give a useful insight into Vietnam's incremental 
capital-output ratio (ICOR), which suggests that the growth rates 
achieved over the period 1992-94 were achieved with an ICOR of 
between 2-2.5. Other countries such as South Korea maintained 
an ICOR of around 2.5 in the 1960s and 1970s, during the early 
stages of its industrialisation. However this is unlikely to be 
maintained, and the government has forecast that this will rise to 
around 3 by the year 2000. This suggests that if Vietnam is to 
maintain real growth rates of GDP at around 8%, investment as a 
proportion of GDP will need to be around 24%. Hence domestic
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savings will need to increase (both in the public and private 
sectors), and Vietnam will be dependent upon foreign private 
sector savings and ODA for some time to come to make up any 
deficiency.
The ICOR figure of 3 by the government has itself been 
questioned. The case of Indonesia may provide a useful example. 
Its ICOR was well above 5 in the early 1980s as growth rates fell 
in response to austerity measures. During 1984-88 it fell to 4.6 
and then 4 during 1989-93, but has since risen to 5 again. China 
has grown more rapidly than Vietnam, but with an ICOR of about 
4 it has taken very large investment flows to achieve its rapid 
growth. The World Bank has pointed out that if Vietnam's ICOR 
were even 3.9 in 1997 instead of 3, and the level of current 
investment remained the same, GDP growth would fall from 
above 8% to around 4% in that year.
Consumer price inflation (see Table 3) abated considerably in 
1989 to 34.7% from 394.0% in 1988 (World Bank), however 
further monetisation of the budget deficit in 1990 further fuelled 
inflation. The authorities were determined to crack down on 
inflation, however, and from 1991 the budget deficit was no 
longer monetised. Since then inflation has come down noticeably 
with the exception of 1994, in which inflation shot up mainly due 
to the increase in food prices arising from the summer floods in 
the Mekong Delta.
There were a series of currency devaluations in 1989, when the 
official rate of the Dong was brought down from D386:$1(US) to 
the then black market rate of D4200:$1(US). The currency 
continued to fall again by mid 1990 reaching a low of 
D14500:$1(US) in November 1991, but then appreciated to 
D10800:$1(US) by the following August (see Table 3). Since this 
time government intervention through the State Bank of Vietnam 
and unusually large inflows of dollars, has maintained the rate at 
around this rate since. The authorities are keen to maintain the
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stability of the local currency as part of its efforts to stem the 
dollarisation of the economy. With this objective in mind a decree 
limiting the use of foreign currency in everyday transactions came 
into force in October 1994. On the other hand exporters have been 
calling for some time for a steeper depreciation of the dong 
against the dollar, to allow them to maintain competitiveness.
Until the reforms of 1988-89, Vietnam's recorded exports 
covered only between one-third and one-half of imports. Even 
before the reforms exports, increasingly, were going to the 
convertible currency area (non CMEA countries, particularly in 
Asia), although most imports continued to come from the non 
convertible area (CMEA). An approximate balance between 
convertible and non convertible exports was reached around
1987. The chronic trade deficits were largely covered by grant aid 
and highly concessional credits from the former Soviet Union. The 
collapse of the communist regimes of Eastern Europe from 1989 
caused the gradual loss of those countries' markets and 
commodity assistance, resulting in their almost complete 
disappearance in 1991 when the CMEA was formally wound up 
and the Soviet Union disintegrated. The reforms to the trade and 
foreign exchange regimes of 1988-89, and Vietnam's emergence as 
an exporter of rice and crude oil, generated a compensating 
increase in exports to the convertible area (primarily Japan, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea, but also 
increasingly Western Europe). In dollar terms merchandise export 
earnings increased by 87% in 1989, and grew at an annual average 
rate of 23% in the six years to 1994. However, even after several 
years of rapid growth merchandise exports still represented only 
around 20% of GDP and in 1994 were worth less than $50(US) 
per head, well behind that of Thailand ($750(US) per head) and 
Indonesia ($199(US) per head).
In 1994 there was a significant shift in the composition of 
Vietnam's exports (see Table 5) as textiles and garments overtook
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sea products and rice to become the country's second largest 
export earner after oil, and shoes also moved into the top ten 
earners. Vietnam's prospects as a low labour cost exporter of 
labour intensive manufactures will improve as it becomes 
integrated in the East Asian and west European markets. Textile 
and garment exports increased in 1994 by 57% to $550 million, 
largely on the basis of increased sales to Western Europe which 
absorbed about half of the total. Because it is denied Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) status, Vietnam is effectively excluded 
from what it sees as potentially the largest market for its textiles, 
the USA, despite the lifting of the trade embargo in February 
1994.
In terms of Vietnam's overall current account performance (see 
Table 4), the traditional deficit is likely to increase in the future on 
the basis of the trade pattern which is already beginning to 
emerge. Strong export growth is usually outpaced by an even 
stronger and largely investment related import increase. There is 
likely to be a further deterioration of the invisibles balance, as 
indicated by developments in 1993 and 1994, arising from 
increased net outflows of interest, profit and dividends. However 
this is being offset by increasingly higher transfers, both public (in 
the form of grant aid) and private, boosted by increased 
remittances from overseas Vietnamese (Viet Kieu), whose 
attachment to the homeland is being actively, and successfully, 
encouraged by the government. In addition it is expected that the 
invisibles balance deficit will be reduced by growing tourism 
receipts. Tourist arrivals topped 1 million in 1994, a threefold 
increase over 1991, and the government is hoping that 3 million 
tourists per year will visit Vietnam by the year 2000.
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Vietnam is strategically placed in the most dynamic region of the 
world economy, although, as observed earlier, it is considerably 
economically backward by comparison with some of its 
neighbours. After the second world war, in East Asia, Japan 
became the first of a series of countries to rapidly develop, to be 
followed in the 1960s and 1970s by Hong Kong, Taiwan, South 
Korea and Singapore and then in the 1980s and 1990s by another 
wave consisting of Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. Another 
group of countries, for a variety of reasons, such as the 
Philippines, Myanmar and Vietnam itself, missed out on the 
economic success of their neighbours. Whilst Vietnam is entering 
the developmental process relatively late, it is at least able to 
derive lessons from the experiences of its newly industrialised, or 
industrialising, neighbours (NICs). The economic success, for 
instance, of South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and other countries 
in the region was largely based on, and facilitated by, a number of 
key variables, including: a strong central government with 
relatively honest and competent civil servants managing the 
economy; extensive land and agricultural reform; a strong 
emphasis on education; a high savings and investment rate; 
openness towards foreign trade (exports) investment and 
technology; declining population growth rate; macroeconomic 
stability.
How has Vietnam fared relative to such developmental 
criteria. Whilst political power is highly centralised in Vietnam 
economic power is highly decentralised (the importance of 
provincial and local governments are relevant here), and civil 
servants are underpaid and not well educated in the ways of a 
market economy. A key component of the reforms has been 
directed towards the agricultural sector and these have proved to 
be very successful as alluded to previously. During the period of 
central planning high priority was given towards health and
VIETNAM'S DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
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education, however recent cuts in government expenditure have 
caused these areas to suffer. Whilst Vietnam has a high literacy 
rate (90%) and 100% primary school enrolment, its educational 
system and technical training facilities have deteriorated 
significantly over the past decade. Domestic savings have 
improved and this is facilitating more investment, however the 
financial system needs to be developed further to ensure that 
domestic savings for productive usage is expanded further. Since 
the late 1980s Vietnam has become increasingly open to foreign 
trade and investment, having some of the most liberal foreign 
investment laws in Asia for example. Macroeconomic stability is 
being achieved, as indicated in a previous section, however the 
population growth rate still remains too high (2. 1%).
Vietnam has made, therefore, some headway in regard to 
achieving desirable outcomes in regard to the growth criteria. 
However it is also clear that while lessons can be learned from the 
experiences of the older NICs (Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) it is 
also clear that economic circumstances have changed in the 1990s, 
with increased economic integration in regard to trade and finance 
suggesting that a policy of strong government intervention in the 
economy, adopted by these countires, may no longer be 
appropriate or possible. Hence the more recent experiences of 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand may be more appropriate.
Vietnam has become more integrated into the world economy 
through a combination of foreign direct investment and foreign 
trade. With its recent membership of ASEAN3 it has become a 
natural trading and investment partner of the emerging South- 
East and East Asian bloc. This region tends to favour a free trade 
rather than protectionist outlook, which will reinforce the 
tendency for Vietnamese international economic policy to be 
strongly, if not radically, free trade in its orientation.
3 In July 1995.
15
Because the world economy in the 1990s is vastly different 
from that of 1950-70 and Vietnam's internal circumstances are 
also significantly different from those of the older NICs when 
their growth spurt began, Vietnam will have to follow its own 
path. Its late emergence to the capitalist economic scene implies 
that Vietnam must simultaneously undertake four trans­
formations: agricultural renovation, reconstruction /  construction 
of its basic infrastructure, develop import substituting industries, 
and expand the export of manufactured goods. This contrasts 
with the NICs who were able to go through each of these in 
discrete stages.
Agricultural renovation in Vietnam has two chief tasks: raising 
the productivity of the sector's existing resource base, and 
secondly to expand the base into hitherto neglected areas such as 
fruit and vegetable growing and livestock rearing. However 
agricultural renovation will also be important for the generation of 
savings, foreign exchange and surplus labour, which will assist in 
the process of industrialisation. This will result in a higher 
demand for consumer goods encouraging the development of rural 
industries such as agro-processing and handicrafts, which will 
provide jobs for the work force made redundant after the 
productivity gains in agriculture.
Considerable construction, or reconstruction, of the economy's 
infrastructure will be required after decades of war. Roads, 
bridges, ports, railways and airports need upgrading and 
extending, and especially in the rural areas. Housing and other 
urban infrastructure need major investment. Major expenditure is 
also required in education, health and the protection of Vietnam's 
fragile environment.
Vietnam is also seeking the creation of import substituting 
industries, for the following reasons. Firstly, to meet the growing 
domestic demand for consumer durables, building materials and 
industrial inputs arising from increased incomes in the agricultural
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sector. Secondly, to make better use of the country's natural 
resource endowment, and thirdly to improve the trade balance. 
Higher domestic savings would provide some of the funds to 
invest in these industries, but foreign capital would also be 
available particularly from countries with their own heavy and 
labour intensive industries to export. The government would offer 
protection for these infant industries in the form of tariff barriers, 
cheap credits, and subsidies to keep wages low. However it is 
necessary to distinguish between what the Government might like 
to do and what it can do. The government appears to be trying to 
encourage import substitution to the extent that it can, however, 
the policy options for the Vietnamese government, and tine 
international environment, are significantly different from those 
faced by countries such as South Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s. 
With regard to product markets, Vietnam is effectively unable to 
control its borders and thereby control imports. Additionally, 
international private capital flows are far more significant and 
more mobile than in the past. Hence Vietnam will need to create 
an environment that is seen to be attractive to foreign investors 
when compared with other countries.
The final component of the development strategy is the 
development of export oriented manufacturing. Until recently 
Vietnam's export growth was heavily based on primary 
commodities. In 1994 there was both growth and diversification 
as garments, in particular, found a lucrative market in the 
European Union. This is a trend which has been encouraged by 
the government, meeting with a ready response from the older and 
newer NICs looking for places in which to relocate their labour 
intensive industries. The country has an advantage in having a 
highly motivated low cost workforce, preferential access to 
certain markets and a government keen to develop export 
processing zones (EPZ) which are ideal for small scale 
manufacturers not interested in developing backward linkages
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into the economy. Foreign direct investment has largely been in 
export oriented areas, where investors can circumvent Vietnam's 
weak physical and institutional infrastructure. The EPZ's offer a 
free trade environment, access to infrastructure and even better 
incentives than are on offer elsewhere.
PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE.
Despite its recent successes, the ability of the government to 
maintain a fast rate of economic growth and development, and to 
be Asia's next newly industrialised country, will require the 
country to successfully address the following key challenges.
1. Deploy its resources effectively
the nation needs to utilise its scarce resources efficiently, 
requiring raising productivity levels in the agricultural sector, 
utilising the entrepreneurial flair of southern businessmen, 
encouraging overseas Vietnamese to invest locally, merging 
viable state enterprises with private investors and utilising 
overseas development assistance (ODA) well.
2. Create equitable wealth
as a strategic priority, for both political and social reasons, 
the country needs to narrow the gap between the "haves" 
and the "have-nots" during the process of economic 
development. The country's average per capita income is 
roughly $220, although in some parts of the country income 
levels are twice the national average (e.g. Ho Chi Mirth City).
3. Control the rate o f population growth
Vietnam is a poor country which is likely to remain 
impoverished until it is able to control the growth of its 
population, which is currently standing at 2.1% a year. The 
1.5 million annual increase in population serves to put further
18
strain on the limited resources of the state, and to put severe 
pressure on the nation's resources.
4. Create employment
the recent loss of employment in the military, amounting to 
some 500,000, and in other areas of the public sector such as 
the state owned enterprises, 800,000, has contributed to 
stubbornly high levels of unemployment. In combination with 
substantial under employment in the rural areas, this 
situation presents a major problem to the government. The 
ability to maintain political stability, and the formation of a 
consumer class providing the foundations for further 
industrialisation, will require the government to bring about 
the creation of jobs across the broad spectrum of society, 
ranging from peasant farmers to university graduates.
5. Maintain sound economic management o f the economy
the attainment of a stable macroeconomy is a key prerequisite 
for further economic development of the economy, as clearly 
evidenced by the experiences of its dynamic economic 
neighbours. This will create the necessary environment for the 
market based economy to perform effectively, by stimulating 
savings and investment, including the attraction of foreign 
investment, and maintaining international competitiveness 
through maintaining a low rate of inflation. To achieve this 
will require control over the budget deficit and monetary 
growth, the need to reduce the large foreign debt and to 
effectively utilise the large capital inflows from international 
development agencies.
6. Invest in human capital and physical infrastructure
there will be a pressing need for Vietnam to invest in the 
education of its people and also in its physical infrastructure.
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Whilst Vietnam has plenty of cheap labour, this will not be 
enough when it eventually hits shortages in trained and 
skilled workers. As discussed earlier Vietnam's infrastructure 
is also very dilapidated, and with limited domestic resources 
the country will need to get access to, and use well, 
international aid and assistance to upgrade its infrastructure.
7. Creation o f  strong and efficient institutions
Vietnam lacks the necessary institutions to support a market 
oriented economy, which will have a detrimental effect, if not 
tackled sufficiently quickly, upon the long term development 
of the economy. It needs to develop a modem Central Bank, 
an independent judiciary, a modem banking system and 
supportive capital markets for the fledgling private sector. 
Measures have already been taken to improve these but they 
are still deficient on many fronts.
8. Reduce its reliance on primary exports (oil, rice and seafood 
products)
Vietnam remains exposed to fluctuations of world 
commodity prices, given its heavy export dependence upon 
crude oil, sea products and rice, which accounted for 52% of 
total exports in 1994. Manufactured exports, supported by 
foreign direct investment, will be required to make a larger 
contribution to external trade in the future. Of particular 
importance will be the development of exports of textiles and 
garments, and electronics. Progress has been made in the 
former as well as that of shoes, but the development of the 
electronics industry is still at a rudimentary level.
9. Prevent the North/South, and rural-urban split from widening 
the gulf between the north and south of Vietnam, as a result 
of history, politics and economics, threatens to become even
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more pronounced as free market reforms take root. Ho Chi 
Minh City is destined to become Vietnam's leading 
commercial centre and international focal point. In order to 
prevent regional disparities the government will need to 
divert more investments to the north and other 
underdeveloped provinces. In addition growing income 
differences between the rural and urban population would 
trigger off urban migration, which has the potential for serious 
disruption and instability.
10. Maintain political stability
whilst economic reform has been a key component of the 
developmental program, political reform, or pluralism, is not 
on the agenda. The coexistence of these two inherently 
conflicting principles is a gamble, as in the case of China, 
which the government is prepared to accept.
CONCLUSIONS
The recent economic performance of the Vietnamese economy 
during its recent transition to a market economy has been 
remarkable, with significant progress having been made in terms 
of real GDP growth, savings and investment, inflation and export 
growth to name but a few. Little multilateral or bilateral 
assistance has been provided to the country during the period of 
its economic reforms, and it has also had to adjust to the loss of 
financial assistance from the former Soviet Union and the need to 
reorientate its trade towards the dynamic East Asian economies. 
A similar transition process has been conducted in Eastern 
Europe with traumatic initial, and for some continuing, 
consequences for output, employment and inflation, which 
Vietnam has largely been successful at avoiding. However 
Vietnam has only completed the first stage in the process of
21
economic development, in which the existing slack within the 
economy is being more fully utilised. The next stage will be more 
difficult, requiring the need to improve the efficiency and 
productivity of its fledgling market economy. Such will require the 
need to improve the structure and institutions upon which the 
economic system is based. If scarce resources are not utilised 
efficiently and bottlenecks arise, the process of economic 
development will come to a halt.
The tasks facing the authorities are many, however there is 
much ground for optimism, despite the enormity of these, and 
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